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Withering Dissents 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meets
periodically to determine the course of monetary policy
for the United States. At each of these meetings the mem-
bers vote on a policy directive, which is a statement about
the desired course of monetary policy in the period between
meetings. When a member disagrees with the policy direc-
tive being proposed, he or she is free to dissent in favor
of an alternative course for policy. Dissents are typically
accompanied by a statement indicating why the member
is opposed to the policy directive and what language or
other direction for policy the member would have preferred.
The accompanying chart shows the total number of
dissents annually since 1983. It indicates that, while dis-
sents have always been infrequent, there has been a decline
in the number of dissents in recent years. The data suggest
that there was a significant change in the number of dis-
sents around 1993 or 1994.1 From 1983 through 1994,
dissents averaged 8.0 per year. Since 1994 the average
number of dissents has been only 2.7 per year. This pattern
appears to be continuing: There have been no dissents
during the first four meetings of 2002.
It is important to note that relatively few FOMC mem-
bers account for a large share of dissents. Former Governor
Martha Seger holds the record during this period, dissenting
17 times during her tenure as a member of the FOMC—
July 2, 1984, to March 11, 1991. But even if Governor
Seger’s dissents are deleted, the average yearly number
of dissents before 1995 is 6.6, more than twice the average
number of dissents since 1994.
There are a number of possible explanations for the
decline in the frequency of dissents. Two of these explana-
tions appear to be in line with the timing of this decline.
One is the observation that the economy has been more
stable since the early 1990s. Inflation has been relatively
low and stable and economic growth has been generally
strong and also more stable. When economic times are
more stable, it seems likely that there will be less reason
for disagreement and, hence, fewer dissents.
A second possible explanation occurred in the fall of
1993. On October 19, 1993, then chairman of the House
Banking Committee, Henry Gonzalez, took the unprece-
dented step of calling all Federal Reserve governors and
Bank presidents to testify before that committee. Many of
the questions he and other committee members asked dealt
with Federal Reserve secrecy. The issue of secrecy per se
is not likely to have affected the number of dissents, since
dissents at one FOMC meeting were made known shortly
after the next meeting. The experience may have caused
some FOMC members to believe that it was important
for the FOMC to speak “with one voice,” however, which
may have made members more reluctant to dissent.
Whatever the reason, and whether for good or ill, the
practice of dissenting appears to be withering. On March
19, 2002, the FOMC stated that it would publicly announce
the roll call of the vote on the federal funds rate target,
including the preferred policy choice of any dissenters.
Whether this new practice will affect the number of dis-
sents remains to be seen.
—Daniel L. Thornton
1The break year was determined by comparing the average number of dissents
before and after each year from 1987 to 1997 and finding the largest mean
difference. The mean difference was 5.27 after 1993 and 5.29 after 1994. The
results are qualitatively the same when Governor Seger’s dissents are deleted.
The difference between the means is statistically significant at the 1 percent
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